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The author engages in a critical analysis of the busing
moratorium statute promoted by the Nixon Administration and
recently passed by Congress. He discusses recent judicial
developments in the desegregation area that have precipitated
enactment of the measure, and takes the position that the
federal judiciary has promulgated a far too liberal interpretation
of the fourteenth amendment in its zeal to achieve politically
untenable social ends. He points out specific defects which
render the statute substantially inadequate as a deterrent to
further student transportation, and indicates the direction of
future legislative solutions to the controversy.
On June 8th of this year, Congress enacted Title VIII of Public Law
No. 92-318, a set of provisions attached to the Higher Education Act
purporting to offer some degree of legislative relief from the recent
escalation of court-ordered transportation of students for purposes of
achieving desegregation.
The act contained a measure aimed at Department of Health,
Education & Welfare administration in the area which prohibits the use
of federal funds for busing unless voluntarily requested by local
officials, and, under any circumstances, where the time or distance of
travel is so great as to risk the health of the children or significantly
impinge on the educational process, or where the educational
opportunities available at the school to which the pupil will be bused
will be substantially inferior to those where he would otherwise be
assigned. A complementary provision forbids federal officials from
requiring the expenditure of state or local money for busing, or from
conditioning the receipt of federal funds upon the implementation of
busing, both with the same qualifications as to voluntary local request,
time or distance, and inferior opportunities.
Directed more specifically at the judiciary is a moratorium on the
implementation of any new or pending United States district court
order to bus until all appeals to such order have been exhausted, or
until January 1, 1974. In addition, there is an authorization to parents
of students transported under finalized court orders to seek interven-
tion or reopening of further effectuation of such orders if the time or
distance would impair health or impinge on the educational process.
Finally, there is a section establishing national uniformity in the
application of rules of evidence required to prove discrimination, and in
the application of desegregation orders.
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HISTORY
A review of the recent history of the busing controversy reveals an
ever-strengthening support in the federal courts for the implementation
of mandatory student transportation as the only acceptable expedient
for eradicating unconstitutional racial separation.' The provision of
section 407(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 which ostensibly denies
courts or officials the use of busing to correct public school segregation,
has been steadily eroded by case law3 to the point where it is applicable
only when the sole purpose of the busing is arbitrarily to obtain a
certain racial mix, there being no applicability where the purpose is to
end state-imposed dualism or its vestiges.4 This position, until very
recently, dictated the promulgation of the vast majority of busing
directives in the southern states, where patterns of segregation could be
readily traced to affirmative state action establishing separate black and
white educational facilities.'
The extension of the controversy into northern metropolitan areas
has been precipitated by a wide array of socio-political factors, but the
judicial rationale for authorization of desegregation plans in what were
heretofore considered de facto situations6 involves the linking of newly
recognized and admittedly subtle forms of governmental action (or
inaction) to the development of ostensibly voluntary residential
patterns.7 The common theme in these cases seems to reveal a desire to
reach the effect while denying the true characterization of the cause.
Thus, what has evolved is a refusal on the part of the federal courts to
acknowledge the obvious limitation on the meaning of "state action"
under the fourteenth amendment in the historic milieu of its
ratification, and a constant redefining of the phrase to satisfy the
necessities of a process of inductive reasoning, whereby any given
1. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Davis v. School
Dist., 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1971); Brewer v. School Bd., 397 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1968).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1970).
3. Clark v. Board of Directors, 328 F. Supp. 1205 (E.D. Ark. 1971). United States v. School
Dist., 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1969).
4. Harvest v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 312 F. Supp. 269 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
5. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v.
United States, 415 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969).
6. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971); Oliver v. School Dist., 448
F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1971).
7. The conflicting developments can be exemplified by reference to a May, 1972 opinion
in Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235, 1243 (D.N.J. 1971), affd, 92 S. Ct. 707 (1972),
which stated, "A continuing trend toward racial imbalance caused by housing patterns
within the various school districts is not susceptible to federal judicial intervention".
In contrast are the findings of Judge Roth in Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582
(E.D. Mich. 1971), that policies of lending institutions and real estate associations and
the availability of government-subsidized low-income housing had officially created the
black city surrounded by white suburbs. A significant reality overlooked by Judge Roth is
that segregated housing would exist to the same degree voluntarily, with or without




predisposed incidence of unconstitutional segregation as a premise can
be made to support a conclusion of "state action" as the cause thereof.
It can only be assumed that this process of declaring de facto to be
de jure is precipitated by a silent recognition among the judiciary that
the resolution of some racial segregation is beyond the reaches of its
constitutional mandate, which recognition is overridden, however, by a
refusal to surrender the question to its proper legislative sphere, fearing
that Congress, in its legitimate discretion, would decline to act against
voluntary residential-based school imbalance.
It is in this context of recent desegregation rulings, the most
extensive of which order the obliteration of political boundaries to
achieve metropolitan balances,8 that Congress and the Administration
have initially intervened. The act clearly represents a first step into an
area heretofore governed by case law directives.9  The previous
legislative treatment primarily concerned procedural requirements for
initiating litigation, guidelines as to the measure of compliance with
desegregation orders' 0 (which guidelines themselves are governed by
reference to judicial imperative),' and federal financing as an incentive
to, and as assistance in, their effectuation.1 2
EFFECTS OF THE ACT
This statute, in contrast, constitutes a congressional embarkation on
a path of independent policy-making in a direction seemingly at odds
with the legal position at which the federal courts have arrived. On its
face, this might appear to present grave constitutional implications as to
the separation of powers between the three governmental branches,' 3
specifically in respect to the Broomfield amendment," establishing the
moratorium on district court orders. There can be little legitimate
doubt, however, that as a result of the power conferred upon Congress
8. Bradley v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972); Johnson v. San Francisco
Unified School Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F.
Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
9. Hoff, The Courts, HEW, and Southern School Desegregation, 77 YALE L.J. 321 (1967),
noted, perhaps now ironically, that for ten years, desegregation supporters contended
that courts were unable to enforce the law and that the legislative powers of government
needed to be invoked. The article further observed an imminent swing back to an aware-
ness that the courts should not retire from the field.
10. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-6 to 2000c-9 (1970).
11. Raney v. Board of Educ., 381 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1967); Clark v. Board of Educ., 374 F.2d.
569 (8th Cir. 1967); Betts v. County School Bd., 269 F. Supp. 593 (W.D. Va. 1967).
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970); Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines, and
School Desegregation in the South, 53 U. VA. L. REv. 42 (1967) discussed Title VI as
heralding an initial legislative approach to desegregation-financial aid as an inducement.
13. O'Malley v. United States, 314 U.S. 574 (1941). Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 477
(1923).




in section 5 of the fourteenth amendment' " and more pointedly in
section 2 of Article III,' 6 where the aim of Congress would be to
develop comprehensive national policy legislation,' ' it has the power
to declare a suspension on the use of remedies by the federal courts (at
least temporarily) in order to engage in the enactment of such
legislation.
Although there exists, of course, no precedent in precisely this type
of situation, Congress has dealt with the question of remedy in the
courts since 1793, in one way or another,' 8 and there appears to be
ample authority for the invocation of this legislative power. It is most
significant that what is being denied by section 803 is the use of one
particular equity remedy: there is no implication of a legislative reversal
of the basic finding of segregated educational facilities as unconstitu-
tional.' 9
On the other hand, there can be found severe limitations on its
effectiveness as even a temporary measure. A crucial blow has already
been dealt by Justice Powell's opinion in a September 1, 1972
decision2 0 denying a request by Augusta, Georgia that a busing order
be stayed due to the moratorium. Acting alone through his broad
supervisory powers over the Fifth Circuit, the Justice ruled that
Congress, through its employment of the phrase "a balance among
students with respect to race" in section 803, intended to suspend the
use of busing only when the goal was "racial balance", which he
indicated was synonymous with eliminating de facto segregation. The
language of the opinion clearly suggests that all traditional southern de
jure desegregation decisions, even when they involve extensive busing,
will be unaffected by the new statute.2 ' Secondly, because it is not
retroactive, the moratorium may discriminate, although not unconstitu-
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5, "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article." (emphasis added).
16. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, "In all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court
shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." (emphasis added).
17. H.R. 13,915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
18. Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945); National Exchange Bank v.
Peters, 144 U.S. 570 (1892); The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381 (1882); Ex Parte Valland-
ingham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864).
19. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. Drummond v. Acree, 41 U.S.L.W. 2123 (U.S. Sept. 1, 1972). The opinion noted, however,
that the prohibition on use of federal funds would remain valid in all cases because
Congress had included the term "desegregation" in the Student Transportation Mora-
torium Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, Title VIII, § 802(a) (June 23, 1972). The signifi-
cance of Justice Powell's decision is heightened by the fact that he is a Southern con-
servative and Nixon appointee. Five other members of the Supreme Court have shown
themselves to be more liberal on racial issues than Justice Powell, thus making it highly
unlikely that the full court would take a position more favorable to the moratorium.
21. The ruling furthermore opens the door to the ironic possibility that the statute could fall
victim to its foremost legislative target and most dangerous philosophical adversary,
the ever-extending judicial interpretation of "de jure."
[Vol. 2
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tionally,2 2 against those who oppose busing but are under final court
directives to do so, and, conversely, against busing proponents whose
orders have been stayed.2" Thirdly, since the Supreme Court is left as
the final authority in each individual case, and since standard
pupil-assignment desegregation cases are handled on an expedited basis
(with appeals being exhausted in a matter of months) much of the time
element supposedly granted by this section would prove to be
illusory. Fourthly, the use of the word "balance" instead of
"desegregation" 2 4 and the use of "socio-economic status ' ' in section
803 may be interpreted to imply a congressional intent to provide
statutory authority, now lacking, for treatment of de facto racial
imbalance situations, and could fortify court efforts to cross school
district lines in order to reach suburban schools.
2
6
As to the other provisions of the act, even greater limitations are
evident. It seems clear, for example, that the entire prohibitive language
of the Ashbrook amendment2 7 is nullified by the proviso "unless
constitutionally required." 2 8 In addition, it is a reasonable possibility
that a request for federal funds by a local school official under a court
22. Hess v. Mullaney, 213 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1954), Carleton Screw Products Co. v. Fleming,
126 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1942), and other cases hold that the Equal Protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment is applicable to the states, but not to Congress.
23. Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 41 U.S.L.W. 2123 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 1972),
clarified any question of retroactivity in denying reconsideration of an application for a
stay pending appeal. The court declared that the Student Transportation Moratorium
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, Title VIII, § 803 (June 23, 1972), has no application to
a case pending at the time of its effective date in which transportation of students, pur-
suant to an integration plan, is already in operation. Thus, this statute creates the in-
equitable result, for example, of leaving the anti-busing forces in Charlotte with no
effective redress, while those similarly disposed in Detroit are summarily freed from
compliance.
24. As noted in Harvest v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 312 F. Supp. 269 (M.D. Fla. 1970),
earlier federal legislation still purports to prohibit busing arbitrarily to obtain a "balance"
per se. Thus, substitution of the term "desegregation", in addition to reflecting ac-
curately an intent to extend the ban to traditional de jure cases, would have dispelled any
inference that Congress, in its deliberation of the moratorium, was accepting the premise
that busing in de facto imbalance situations was, but for the measure it was enacting,
valid.
25. Legislative approval could be inferred for busing orders which treat socio-economic
status as offering the same possibilities of discrimination as now exist in regard to race,
religion, and sex.
26. Bradjey v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972); Morgan v. Hennigan, C.A. No.
72-911-G (D. Mass. filed Mar. 15, 1972); Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D.
Mich. 1971); Jenkins v. Township of Morris School District, C.A. No. A-117 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. filed June 25, 1971).
27. Student Transportation Moratorium Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, Title VIII, § 802
(b) (June 23, 1972).
28. The decision regarding constitutionality can be made administratively as well as ju-
dicially, as noted in Whittenberg v. Greenville County School Dist., 298 F. Supp. 784
iD.S.C. 1969), and Alabama NAACP State Conference of Branches v. Wallace, 269 F.
Supp. 346 (M.D. Ala. 1967). Thus, such a decision would render meaningless the
prohibitory language here used.
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order to bus would be qualified as a "voluntary request ' 2  under
section 802(a). The qualifications in the funding section as to time or
distance risking health or impinging on the educational process (elusive
stipulations in any event), which also appear in section 804 as a basis
for reopening final cases, again provide only the illusion of additional
relief, inasmuch as this provision merely reiterates standards pro-
nounced in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg.3" The other provision of
section 802 prohibiting the use of funds for busing where the student
will be transported to a relatively inferior school, also bears the
possibility of interpretative peril: successful attack under this provision
against a busing order requires proof that one school is inferior, and in
so doing, might concomitantly prove discrimination, thereby introduc-
ing the constitutional basis on which busing to and from the inferior
school could be ordered.
Finally, as noted above, the busing provision of section 407(a) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964" is substantially impotent as prohibitive
legislation, and, therefore, its extension to all geographical areas by
section 806 of this act represents little more than a token gesture
toward uniformity in a process which has had its impact fairly
consistently and nearly exclusively in the South. Considering these
grave weaknesses as even an interim remedy, it seems imperative that a
constitutional amendment,3 2 some constitutionally valid permanent
denial of the remedy,3 or some equally effective but less disruptive
means of desegregating is necessary as a substantive solution.
TRENDS
The direction in which the nation is currently inclined affords
probabilities of serious social and institutional disruption. On one hand,
with continued judicial preemption of the field, leading to further
student transportation orders, integration, so far as it is alleged to be
sociologically and educationally beneficial, would be achieved most
expediently.3 4 This would be at the expense, however, of considerable
impairment of other educational factors.
29. An affirmative obligation of a school board, imposed by the courts, to erect a unitary
nonracial school system, currently implies that the school board's implementation of a
busing plan is the only acceptable remedy as noted in Valley v. Rapides Parish School
Bd., 434 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1970).
30. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
32. Although numerous amendments are under consideration, one which has received sub-
stantial support in the House provides that: "No public school student shall, because of
his race, creed, or color, be assigned to or required to attend a particular school",
H.R.J. Res. 620 § 1, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
33. H.R. 13,915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
34. H.E.W., SCHOOL DESEGREGATION VIA COMPULSORY PUPIL TRANSFER: EARLY EFFECTS ON
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CHILDREN (Report to U.S. Office of Education, Bureau of Research), at
101 (1967); H.E.W., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (The Coleman Report, U.S.
Office of Education), at 29 (1965).
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Foremost among them is the neighborhood school system,3" a
historically effective vehicle of public enlightenment and educational
experimentation standing as one of the last bastions of local-govern-
ment control and community accountability in a nation that has
forfeited most of its governmental functions to remote and inaccessible
bureaucracies without knowledge of, or flexibility for, the unique
problems of the individual community. That the destruction of local
attendance patterns by busing will effectuate such a forfeiture is
patently obvious. It should be clear from countless experiences in other
areas3 6 that the headlong drive for national uniformity and equaliza-
tion has had disastrous effects on all that is inherently beneficial in a
concept of diverse federalism.' 7
A direct corollary to the loss of community control would be the
elimination of property taxes as a revenue source for public schools
under pressure from suburban dwellers, who would come to bear all the
burdens of school financing while facing the prospect of reaping none
of the benefits.3" More drastically, the move toward metropolitaniza-
tion as in Indianapolis, Detroit, and Pasadena3 9 signals an encroach-
ment upon internal political jurisdictions that were clearly not drawn
for discriminatory purposes and should therefore be protected by the
Tenth Amendment.4 0
In light of the critical developments in this area, the time is ripe for
substantive legislative action. Despite the heated political atmosphere, it
seems a safe assumption that any permanent statutory reform or
constitutional amendment would, as the moratorium, eliminate busing
as a remedy, without tampering with the underlying concept of
desegregation as a desirable goal. Thus, the imperatives of Brown and its
progeny 4 would stand, but would have to be implemented by less
expedient and perhaps more expensive methods, without, however, the
disruptive facets of the current corrective instrumentalities.
35. Rader, Demise of the Neighborhood School Plan, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 594 (1970); Racial
Imbalance and Municipal Boundaries, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 354 (1970).
36. Brune, Federal-State Relationships as Affected by Judicial Decisions, 8 U. CHL
L. S. REC. 1 (Spec. Supp. 1958).
37. Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 945 (1964).
38. In a related respect, a number of decisions have required state legislatures to restruc-
ture funding law to avoid discrimination based on district wealth. Rodriguez v. San
Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971), Serrano v. Priest,
5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971), prob. juris. noted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3007 (U.S. July 11,
1972).
39. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1971); Bradley v.
Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Spangler v. Passadena City Bd. of Educ.,
311 F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
40. A favorable sign is evident in the Fourth Circuit, where approval was given for the creation
of new school districts for cities that were previously included in large county school
districts. United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 442 F.2d 575 (4th Cir.
1971); Wright v. Council, 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971); and where Bradley v. School
Bd., 40 U.S.L.W. 2813 (4th Cir. June 6, 1972) was reversed June 6, 1972 primarily on
tenth amendment grounds.
41. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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The Equal Educational Opportunities Act 4 2 proposed by the Nixon
Administration would appear to concur in this assessment. Basically,
that bill sets forth a priority list of alternative remedies' for securing
fourteenth amendment rights that seeks to exclude busing. These
include traditional neighborhood assignment,4" freedom of choice
plans,4 4 creation or revision of attendance zones (without busing4" )
construction of new schools or the closing of inferior ones, 4 6 the use of
magnet schools or educational parks, 4 ' and any other plan, as the last
priority which is "educationally sound and administratively feasible" (a
highly nebulous characterization). Considering some of the temporal
and financial difficulties of the first-listed alternatives, the last one
presents a serious weakness as a positive curb to busing.
An inconsistency exists between the avowed purpose of the bill and
the qualifications of the last-listed priority, most particularly that
caveat 4 I which indicates that busing could be ordered if there exists
clear and convincing evidence that no other method is operative.
Despite the affirmative and definite stipulation that any busing only be
temporary, that it not involve pupils below the seventh grade level,4 9
that it not pose dangers to health or the educational process, and that
the order could be stayed pending appeal,' 0 the fact remains that this
exception leaves open the possibility of promulgating the same process
which the act seeks to curtail-the invocation of the courts as the
arbiters of the acceptability of a given desegregation scheme.
42. H.R. 13,915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
43. Geographic zones have been held acceptable only if they are established in good faith and
not for purposes of preserving segregation or minimizing integration. Ellis v. Board of
Pub. Instruction, 423 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1970); Graves v. Board of Educ., 299 F. Supp.
843 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
44. Freedom-of-choice plans have been approved only in the relatively few cases where the
plans offered realistic promise of promptly and effectively eliminating a state-imposed
dual system. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Jackson
v. Marvell School Dist. No. 22, 416 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Board of
Educ., 301 F. Supp. 1024 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
45. Pairing, clustering, and other rezoning methods have generally had a favorable reception
in the courts, but frequently involve busing. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburr Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Youngblood v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 430 F.2d b25 (5th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Mathews, 430 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1970).
46. Courts have insisted that the location of new physical facilities promote, rather than
frustrate, the establishment of a unitary school system. Bradley v. School Bd., 338
F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 317 F. Supp.
980 (M.D. Tenn. 1970).
47. This is a relatively innovative concept which seems to imply undesirable consolidation
and possible large financial expenditures.
48. H.R. 13,915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 402(g) (1972).
49. The House version, passed August 17, 1972, which is generally considered to have little
chance of Senate approval, adopts more restrictive terms, limiting busing as a last re-
sort to the school second closest to the student's home, regardless of his age level. Rep.
Albert Quie (R. Minn.), although a leading supporter of the bill, has expressed fears
that a failure to make distinctions based upon the age of the pupil may overstep the guide-
lines of Swann, which indicated that the age factor would be of paramount significance
in determining the limits of student transfer. 118 CONG. REc. 7,874 (daily ed. Aug. 17,
1972).
50. H.R. 13,915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 403-04 (1972).
Recent Legislative Developments
In a more general sense, also, the Administration's proposal exposes
its central weaknesses by attempting to guard its constitutional flanks.
It suggests in its "findings" that the abolition of "dual school systems
and their vestiges" (referring to Southern state-enforced segregation)
has been virtually completed, while making concessions in its remedies
section to a position that voluntary residentially-based imbalance might
also be a matter necessitating remedy.' '
Both the moratorium and the substantive bill are affirmative steps
toward curtailing the execution of transportation orders, but they lack
decisiveness and continue to invite litigation of the busing issue. The
ultimate remedy would be a constitutional amendment which, 1)
positively defines the limits of "state action" which produces
unconstitutional segregation (the phrase, as previously noted, has
hopelessly strayed from its original contextual meaning by socially
innovative judicial interpretation); and, 2) positively deny the use of
busing or the transversing of political boundaries as a corrective. Such
an amendment would place the responsibility for the pace and direction
of social change in the public school field back in the hands of the
citizenry and its elected representatives. A less dramatic, but more
feasible solution would be a flat legislative ban on busing, unfettered by
weakening qualifications, which would additionally provide for
reopening and modification of final orders to comply with its
provisions. It can only be hoped that those who seek a solution in this
area recognize that a permanent and retroactive denial of the present
equity remedy is the only certain way of the laying the matter to rest.
GWP
THE MARYLAND SECURITY DEPOSIT ACT'
In recent years many of the common law precepts go:'erning
the landlord-tenant relationship have been either reconstrued by
the courts or revised by statute. This revolution stems from
both the deteriorating conditions of poor, urban dwellers and
the trend toward multiple-unit dwelling in our rapidly changing
society. The Maryland Legislature, in passing the new security
deposit law, has attempted to keep pace with these changing
requirements. The new law approaches the landlord-tenant
relationship not from the traditional view of an owner of real
51. These debilitating inconsistencies can all be traced simply to the failure of the bill to
define sharply the limits of de jure segregation, whether such failure be due to political
pressures or doubts as to the validity of such a legislatively-drawn distinction under
judicial scrutiny (i.e., that such a substantive declaration might exceed the bounds of the
Article IH authorization to formulate remedial restrictions on the courts).
1. Law of May 31, 1972, ch. 717, §§ 41-43H, [19721 Laws of Md. 1803, formerly ch. 633, § 1
[1969] Laws of Md. 1452 and ch. 291, § 1 [19711 Laws of Md. 604.
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